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Documentation Index

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KaireonAI is built with security at every layer. This page covers the full security posture — encryption, isolation, access control, input validation, audit logging, and compliance features that are built into the platform, not bolted on.

Architecture Overview

Security is enforced at four boundaries:
  1. Network — TLS in transit, SSRF prevention, rate limiting, circuit breakers
  2. Authentication — Multiple auth methods (password, SSO, MFA, API keys) with secure credential storage
  3. Authorization — Role-based access control with tenant isolation on every query
  4. Data — Encryption at rest, PII masking, tamper-evident audit logging
Every API endpoint validates input with Zod schemas before processing. The formula engine uses a custom recursive-descent parser — dynamic code execution is never used.

Encryption

At Rest

All sensitive credentials (connector passwords, API tokens, OAuth secrets) are encrypted with AES-256-GCM before storage. Each credential record uses a unique initialization vector (IV) and authentication tag, preventing both decryption and tampering without the encryption key. Platform API keys (prefixed krn_) are stored as one-way hashes — the original key cannot be recovered from the database.

In Transit

All connections to KaireonAI use HTTPS/TLS. The hosted playground at playground.kaireonai.com enforces TLS. Self-hosted deployments should terminate TLS at the load balancer or reverse proxy.

Tenant Isolation

Every API request is scoped to a single tenant. Cross-tenant data access is architecturally prevented.
  • Tenant resolution — Each request resolves a tenantId from the JWT session or the API key binding. API key authentication ignores the X-Tenant-Id header to prevent spoofing.
  • Database enforcement — The enforceTenantFilter() helper injects tenantId into every Prisma where clause. The withTenantScope() wrapper provides scoped CRUD methods that automatically include the tenant filter.
  • PostgreSQL Row-Level Security — Database-level RLS policies provide a second layer of isolation, ensuring that even raw SQL queries cannot access data outside the tenant boundary.
  • Fail closed — If the tenant cannot be resolved or validated, the request is denied with 403 Forbidden. If the database is unreachable during validation, the request is also denied.
  • Single-tenant mode — Self-hosted deployments can set SINGLE_TENANT_MODE=true to bypass multi-tenant resolution.
There is no admin bypass that returns data across tenants. Every database query passes through tenant filtering.

Authentication

KaireonAI supports multiple authentication methods:
MethodDescription
PasswordBcrypt-hashed passwords with configurable rounds. Passwords are never stored in plaintext.
SAML SSOEnterprise single sign-on via SAML 2.0. Configure your IdP (Okta, Azure AD, OneLogin, etc.) in Settings.
TOTP/MFATime-based one-time passwords per RFC 6238 (compatible with any TOTP authenticator app). Endpoints at /api/v1/auth/mfasetup, enable, verify, disable — are implemented with encrypted secret storage, one-way-hashed backup codes, timing-safe comparison, and rate-limited verification. Session-level enforcement in middleware is staged but not yet active (pending a verify-to-session update flow); enrollment and manual verification already work end-to-end. WebAuthn is planned.
API KeysProgrammatic access with krn_-prefixed keys. Keys are hashed at creation — the plaintext is shown once and never stored.
Google OAuthSocial login via Google OAuth 2.0 for development and smaller teams.

Account Lockout

Failed login attempts trigger progressive account lockout. The lockout counter uses atomic database operations to prevent race conditions where concurrent failed attempts could bypass the threshold. After the configured number of failures (default 5), the account is locked for a cooldown period.

Internal Service Authentication

Internal service-to-service calls (e.g., worker to API) authenticate with a dedicated INTERNAL_SERVICE_SECRET environment variable. This secret is separate from NEXTAUTH_SECRET — the platform no longer falls back to the NextAuth secret for internal auth, preventing accidental secret reuse.

Session Security

Authentication uses JWT-based sessions via NextAuth. Session tokens are HTTP-only cookies with Secure and SameSite flags in production. Tokens have configurable expiry.

Authorization (RBAC)

Three built-in roles control access:
RolePermissions
AdminFull access: create/edit/delete all entities, manage users, view audit logs, configure retention, approve changes
EditorCreate and edit offers, flows, pipelines, rules, and policies. Cannot manage users or view audit logs.
ViewerRead-only access to all platform data. Cannot create, edit, or delete any entity.
Role checks are enforced at the API route level. UI elements are hidden based on role, but the server-side check is the authoritative gate.

SCIM Provisioning

Automated user lifecycle management via SCIM 2.0. Provision and deprovision users from your identity provider (Okta, Azure AD, etc.) without manual account creation.

Input Validation

Every API endpoint validates request bodies, query parameters, and path parameters with Zod schemas before any business logic executes. Invalid requests are rejected with structured error messages.

Safe Formula Engine

The formula engine (used for computed values in decision flows) is a custom tokenizer + recursive-descent parser. It supports arithmetic, comparison, ternary, and built-in functions (min, max, round, abs, coalesce, concat).
  • No dynamic code execution of any kind (eval, Function constructor, etc. are never called)
  • Syntax errors produce clear error messages, not runtime crashes

SQL Injection Protection

Filter conditions in pipelines and qualification rules use a structured field + operator + value model, not raw SQL string concatenation. The filter engine parses the field name, operator, and value as separate typed parameters, then constructs parameterized queries. This eliminates SQL injection by design — there is no regex-based sanitization step that could be bypassed.

SSRF Prevention

URL validation on all outbound requests blocks access to internal network addresses (private IP ranges, localhost, metadata endpoints). This prevents server-side request forgery through connector configurations, webhook URLs, and external scoring endpoints. The validation covers IPv4 private ranges (10.x, 172.16-31.x, 192.168.x), IPv6 loopback and link-local, and cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254).

CSRF Protection

API-key-authenticated requests enforce Content-Type: application/json validation. Requests without the correct content type are rejected, preventing cross-site request forgery via form submissions or image tags that cannot set custom content types.

PII Protection

Masking Transforms

Data pipelines include two built-in transforms for protecting sensitive data:
  • Hash transform — Replaces field values with a one-way SHA-256 hash for pseudonymization
  • Mask PII transform — Pattern-based masking that preserves partial information (e.g., ***-**-6789 for SSN, u***@example.com for email)
Both transforms are available as pipeline nodes in the visual editor.

Connector Credential Masking

Connector authConfig fields are never returned in any API response. All GET endpoints for connectors explicitly exclude credential fields from the database select clause. This applies to list, detail, and search responses — credentials are write-only.

Encrypted Connector Credentials

Connector authConfig fields (passwords, tokens, secrets) are stored as AES-256-GCM encrypted JSON. The encryption key is derived from the CONNECTOR_ENCRYPTION_KEY environment variable.

WhatsApp Credentials

WhatsApp channel credentials are encrypted with the same AES-256-GCM scheme as other connector credentials.

Audit Logging

All entity mutations (create, update, delete) are recorded in an immutable audit log with a SHA-256 cryptographic integrity chain.

Tamper Evidence

Each audit record’s hash is computed over its contents plus the hash of the previous record, forming a blockchain-style chain. Tampering with any record breaks the chain from that point forward.
hash[n] = SHA-256(action + entityType + entityId + ... + hash[n-1])
The verification endpoint (GET /api/v1/audit-logs/verify) checks the entire chain and reports the first broken link if tampering is detected.

Resilience

The audit system uses a circuit breaker pattern. If the database is temporarily unavailable, events are buffered in memory (up to 500) and flushed when connectivity is restored. A per-tenant mutex prevents hash chain forks from concurrent writes. If audit events are dropped (buffer full, persistent database failure), a drop counter is incremented and a CRITICAL-level log is emitted with the count of lost events. This ensures that audit data loss is never silent — your log aggregator will catch it even if the database cannot.

Export

Audit logs can be exported in JSON, CSV, or SOC 2 format via GET /api/v1/audit-export for regulatory reporting and evidence collection.

Rate Limiting & Circuit Breakers

Rate Limiting

Sliding-window rate limiting is applied to all endpoints, including /api/health and /api/ready. Limits are configurable per route and return standard 429 Too Many Requests responses with Retry-After headers when exceeded. Rate limiting health and readiness probes prevents denial-of-service attacks that target monitoring endpoints.

Circuit Breakers

External service calls (connectors, webhooks, third-party APIs) are wrapped in circuit breakers that:
  • Track failure rates over a configurable window
  • Open the circuit after a threshold is exceeded, failing fast instead of waiting for timeouts
  • Automatically retry after a cooldown period

Webhook Security

Inbound webhooks are verified using signature verification. Each webhook delivery includes a signature header computed with a shared secret, preventing spoofed payloads.

GDPR / CCPA Compliance

DSAR (Data Subject Access Requests)

The /api/v1/dsar endpoint supports both right-of-access (data export) and right-to-erasure (data deletion) requests. DSAR processing is asynchronous via a job queue. Consent state is tracked per customer and respected in decision flows. Customers without active consent are excluded from decisioning.

Data Retention

Configurable per-tenant retention policies control how long different data classes are kept:
Data ClassWhat It Covers
interactionsCustomer interaction history and response records
decisionsDecision trace records
metricsBehavioral and pipeline execution metrics
auditAudit log entries (supports legal hold)
Legal hold can be applied to any data class to prevent automatic purging regardless of the retention period.

Responsible Disclosure

If you discover a security vulnerability in KaireonAI, please report it responsibly. See SECURITY.md on GitHub for our disclosure policy and contact information.

Compliance & Privacy

Tenant isolation, audit logging, DSAR, PII masking, data retention

Authentication

User auth, API keys, SSO, and session management

Audit Logs API

Full API reference for audit log endpoints