Cron Jobs - KaireonAI

These endpoints are system-only. They are authenticated with a shared secret: every /api/v1/cron/* route accepts CRON_SECRET or the legacy CRON_TOKEN alias (whichever is set), and the legacy /api/cron/tick accepts either as well. They are intended to be invoked by the in-process maintenance scheduler, AWS EventBridge Scheduler, or an equivalent external cron.During pilot / initial deployment, EventBridge is typically not wired. That means:

/api/cron/tick exists and is callable, but is effectively unused until a scheduler starts hitting it.
Alert rules and report schedules will not fire automatically until a caller invokes this endpoint.
Features like Run Now (reports) and on-demand alert evaluation work independently and do not require any cron wiring.

See EventBridge Setup for the setup path (marked optional on purpose).

GET /api/v1/cron/export-interactions

Exports new interaction history rows for all active tenants as Hive-partitioned NDJSON files. Uses checkpoint tracking to export only rows created since the last run. Intended to be called by a cron scheduler (e.g., Vercel Cron Jobs, Kubernetes CronJob). Processes up to 10,000 rows per tenant per invocation.

Authentication

Requires a CRON_SECRET token via either:

Authorization: Bearer <CRON_SECRET> header
X-Cron-Secret: <CRON_SECRET> header

File Layout

exports/{tenantId}/interaction_history/year=YYYY/month=MM/day=DD/batch-{timestamp}.json

Each file contains newline-delimited JSON (NDJSON), compatible with Hive, Spark, Athena, and other data lake tools.

Response

{
  "ok": true,
  "totalExported": 8500,
  "tenants": [
    {
      "tenantId": "tenant_001",
      "tenantName": "Acme Corp",
      "exported": 5200,
      "filePath": "exports/tenant_001/interaction_history/year=2026/month=03/day=30/batch-2026-03-30T02-00-00-000Z.json"
    },
    {
      "tenantId": "tenant_002",
      "tenantName": "Beta Inc",
      "exported": 3300,
      "filePath": "exports/tenant_002/interaction_history/year=2026/month=03/day=30/batch-2026-03-30T02-00-01-000Z.json"
    }
  ]
}

Error Handling

If export fails for one tenant, other tenants continue processing. Failed tenants include an error field and their checkpoint is marked as failed for retry on the next run.

In production, replace the local filesystem writes with S3 uploads via @aws-sdk/client-s3. The file paths follow the same Hive-style partitioning scheme.

GET /api/v1/cron/cleanup

Periodic data cleanup that removes expired suppressions, purges interaction history, interaction summaries, and decision traces according to each tenant’s retention configuration, and ensures future database partitions exist.

Authentication

Requires CRON_SECRET via Authorization: Bearer <secret> or X-Cron-Secret header. If CRON_SECRET is not set in the environment, the endpoint is fail-closed and rejects every request with 401.

Cleanup Operations

Operation	Description
Expired suppressions	Deletes any suppression entry whose expiry timestamp is in the past. Event-driven; does not consult per-tenant retention settings.
Per-tenant history purge	For every tenant, applies that tenant’s retention settings — history days, summary days, decision-trace days — together with the `legalHold` flag. Purges interaction history, interaction summary rows (all four period types — daily, weekly, monthly, all-time), and decision-trace rows. A tenant with `legalHold = true` is skipped per-table and surfaced in `legalHoldSkips`.
Expired variant assignments	Per tenant, deletes experiment variant-assignment rows past their expiry, counted in `expiredVariantAssignments`.
Aged audit logs	Per tenant, purges audit-log rows older than the retention window, counted in `oldAuditLogs`.
Published outbox events	Per tenant, removes already-published outbox rows, counted in `publishedOutboxEvents`.
Partition maintenance	Creates database partitions for the next 3 months (non-fatal if partitions are not configured).

A failure inside one tenant’s purge is captured in perTenantErrors and does not abort the run — the cron will continue with the remaining tenants and still emit a 200 response.

Response

{
  "status": "ok",
  "cleaned": {
    "expiredSuppressions": 45,
    "tenantsProcessed": 12,
    "totalHistoryPurged": 8400,
    "totalSummariesPurged": 1200,
    "totalDecisionsPurged": 600,
    "legalHoldSkips": {
      "tenant-uuid-1": ["interactions", "decisions"]
    },
    "partitionsEnsured": 1,
    "expiredVariantAssignments": 30,
    "oldAuditLogs": 512,
    "publishedOutboxEvents": 1840,
    "perTenantErrors": []
  },
  "timestamp": "2026-04-27T02:00:00.000Z"
}

Error Codes

Code	Reason
`401`	Invalid or missing CRON_SECRET
`500`	Cleanup operation failed

GET /api/v1/cron/staging-janitor

Reaps leaked _flow_* staging tables — the per-run source/transform/branch scratch tables the pipeline runtime materializes. Tables belonging to in-flight runs are never dropped; only orphaned tables (the run row was deleted, or the run finished before the retention cutoff) are removed. Tables matching the _flow_* prefix but not the expected shape are counted as unparseable and left in place.

Authentication

Requires CRON_SECRET (or the legacy CRON_TOKEN alias) via Authorization: Bearer <secret>. Fail-closed with 401 when neither is set.

Configuration

Env var	Default	Description
`FLOW_STAGING_RETENTION_HOURS`	`24`	Staging tables for finished runs older than this window are dropped. In-flight runs are exempt regardless of age.

Response

{
  "ok": true,
  "scanned": 42,
  "dropped": 7,
  "kept": 33,
  "unparseable": 2,
  "errors": [],
  "droppedTables": ["_flow_xform_abc123_node4", "_flow_branch_abc123_b1_d2"]
}

droppedTables is capped at the first 50 entries in the response; the full list is written to the log.

Error Codes

Code	Reason
`401`	Invalid or missing CRON_SECRET / CRON_TOKEN
`500`	Janitor run failed

Invoked hourly by the in-process maintenance scheduler when a cron secret is set (see Cron tier), and available to any external scheduler (EventBridge, Kubernetes CronJob).

GET /api/v1/cron/approvals-expire

Sweeps every pending approval request and flips any that has aged past APPROVAL_MAX_AGE_HOURS (default 168 hours = 7 days) to status = "expired". The operation is a single bulk database write and is fully idempotent — running it again immediately is a no-op because no rows match the cutoff anymore.

Authentication

Same CRON_SECRET shared-header pattern as /api/v1/cron/cleanup:

Authorization: Bearer <CRON_SECRET> header
X-Cron-Secret: <CRON_SECRET> header

Unset CRON_SECRET → the endpoint rejects all requests with 401 (fail-closed).

Configuration

Env var	Required	Description
`CRON_SECRET`	Yes	Shared secret. Fail-closed when unset.
`APPROVAL_MAX_AGE_HOURS`	No	Maximum age in hours before a pending approval auto-expires. Default `168` (7 days). Invalid values fall back to the default.

Recommended schedule

Every 15 minutes is plenty — the operation is O(rows-to-expire) at the database with zero per-row work in Node. Once nothing is left to expire, each invocation is essentially free.

Response

{
  "status": "ok",
  "maxAgeHours": 168,
  "cutoff": "2026-04-16T17:00:00.000Z",
  "expired": 7,
  "durationMs": 23,
  "timestamp": "2026-04-23T17:00:00.000Z"
}

Error codes

Code	Reason
`401`	Missing or invalid `CRON_SECRET`
`500`	Underlying database write failed (transient DB issue)

GET /api/v1/cron/ai-autopilot

Decisioning Autopilot sweep. For every tenant it gathers experiment-promotion and model-drift proposals, persists them as AiRecommendation rows (source: "autopilot"), then acts according to the tenant’s aiAutopilot.mode:

suggest — inbox only (proposals created, nothing applied).
auto_gated — opens an ApprovalRequest for each proposal.
auto — applies the change and writes an audit entry.

Authentication

CRON_SECRET via Authorization: Bearer <secret> or X-Cron-Secret: <secret>. Fail-closed with 401 when CRON_SECRET is unset.

Response

{
  "ok": true,
  "tenants": 12,
  "proposalsCreated": 34,
  "applied": 8,
  "approvalsOpened": 5,
  "errors": 0,
  "summaries": []
}

GET /api/v1/cron/ai-sentinel

Decision Sentinel sweep (recommended every 30 min). Computes suppression_rate and empty_candidate_rate per tenant, writes System Health alerts on breach, and — only for tenants with aiAutopilot.sentinelAutoPause = true — pauses active flows on a hard breach.

Authentication

CRON_SECRET via Authorization: Bearer <secret> or X-Cron-Secret: <secret>. Fail-closed with 401 when CRON_SECRET is unset.

Response

{
  "ok": true,
  "tenants": 12,
  "breaches": 2,
  "alertsCreated": 2,
  "flowsPaused": 1,
  "summaries": []
}

Complete cron job catalog

Every /api/v1/cron/* job uses the same CRON_SECRET (or legacy CRON_TOKEN) bearer auth and fails closed when the secret is unset. Jobs documented in full above are cross-linked; the rest share the same auth and an { "ok": true, ... } response shape.

Job	Verb	Purpose
`ai-autopilot`	GET	Autopilot proposal sweep (documented above).
`ai-sentinel`	GET	Decision Sentinel breach sweep (documented above).
`approvals-expire`	GET	Expire pending approvals past `APPROVAL_MAX_AGE_HOURS` (documented above).
`backfill-direction-adaptations`	POST	One-shot backfill of inbound/outbound `model_adaptations` from historical `interaction_history`.
`cleanup`	GET	Retention purge of history/summaries/traces + partition maintenance (documented above).
`drain-queues`	GET/POST	Drain the BullMQ queues with ephemeral workers (see Drain Queues).
`dsar-purge`	GET	Purge tenant data past the `RetentionConfig` window (DSAR / right-to-erasure).
`engagement-health-recompute`	GET	Nightly recompute of `CustomerEngagementHealth` from the last 90 days.
`export-interactions`	GET	Hive-partitioned NDJSON export of new interaction history (documented above).
`fairness-recheck`	GET	Re-run the fairness gate for tenants with continuous recheck; auto-pause on drift.
`flow-scheduler-tick`	GET	Dispatch due schedule- and file-arrival-triggered pipelines (also runs in-process).
`gitops-drift-check`	GET	Nightly compare of live resources vs the last-applied GitOps YAML snapshot.
`outbox-reaper`	GET	Reset `outbox_events` rows stuck in `processing` past the staleness window back to `pending`.
`scheduled-retrains`	GET	Trigger due model retrains and apply evidence decay to adaptations.
`siem-ship`	GET	Push recent `AuditLog` rows to the configured SIEM.
`staging-janitor`	GET	Reap orphaned `_flow_*` staging tables (documented above).
`system-health-purge`	GET	Delete `SystemHealthAlert` rows past retention (`pinned` rows are kept).

POST /api/cron/tick

System cron endpoint that evaluates every enabled alert rule and fires every due report schedule for every tenant in a single pass. The intended automated caller is AWS EventBridge, invoking the endpoint at whatever cadence matches your windowMinutes values (every 1–5 minutes is typical). See EventBridge Setup for the wiring path.

Pilot deployments: During pilot / initial rollout, EventBridge is typically not wired. The endpoint still exists and can be invoked on demand via curl with a valid CRON_TOKEN — useful for development, smoke testing, or one-off evaluation pushes. Without an external caller hitting it on a cadence, alerts and scheduled reports do not fire automatically; use the UI’s Run Now / Test buttons or the per-entity /run-now APIs for immediate delivery.

Authentication

Requires a CRON_TOKEN via either:

x-cron-token: <CRON_TOKEN> header (preferred)
x-cron-secret: <CRON_TOKEN> header (legacy, same value)
Authorization: Bearer <CRON_TOKEN> header

Unset CRON_TOKEN → the endpoint rejects all requests with 401 (fail-closed).

Example

curl -X POST https://your-deployment/api/cron/tick \
  -H "x-cron-token: $CRON_TOKEN"

Response

{
  "ok": true,
  "tenantsProcessed": 3,
  "rulesEvaluated": 12,
  "rulesFired": 2,
  "errors": [],
  "durationMs": 187,
  "timestamp": "2026-04-17T12:34:56.789Z"
}

Error Isolation

Per-tenant and per-rule errors are caught and reported in the errors array; a failing tenant does not abort the tick for other tenants:

{
  "ok": false,
  "tenantsProcessed": 2,
  "rulesEvaluated": 7,
  "rulesFired": 1,
  "errors": [
    { "tenantId": "tenant-c", "error": "evaluator threw: pg offline" }
  ],
  "durationMs": 245,
  "timestamp": "2026-04-17T12:34:56.789Z"
}

ok is true only when errors is empty.

Environment Variables

Variable	Required	Description
`CRON_SECRET`	Recommended	Shared secret for `/api/v1/cron/*` maintenance endpoints
`CRON_TOKEN`	Required only when `/api/cron/tick` is used	Shared secret for `/api/cron/tick` alert + schedule evaluation. Falls back to `CRON_SECRET` when unset. Leave unset during pilot if you’re not wiring a scheduler.
`APPROVAL_MAX_AGE_HOURS`	No	Cutoff age (in hours) for `/api/v1/cron/approvals-expire`. Default `168` = 7 days.

When you wire an automated scheduler, match the cadence to the workload:

tick: every 1–5 minutes (matches the smallest windowMinutes across your alert rules)
export-interactions: Every hour or every 6 hours depending on data volume
cleanup: Once daily (e.g., 0 3 * * *)

​GET /api/v1/cron/export-interactions

​Authentication

​File Layout

​Response

​Error Handling

​GET /api/v1/cron/cleanup

​Authentication

​Cleanup Operations

​Response

​Error Codes

​GET /api/v1/cron/staging-janitor

​Authentication

​Configuration

​Response

​Error Codes

​GET /api/v1/cron/approvals-expire

​Authentication

​Configuration

​Recommended schedule

​Response

​Error codes

​GET /api/v1/cron/ai-autopilot

​Authentication

​Response

​GET /api/v1/cron/ai-sentinel

​Authentication

​Response

​Complete cron job catalog

​POST /api/cron/tick

​Authentication

​Example

​Response

​Error Isolation

​Environment Variables

GET /api/v1/cron/export-interactions

Authentication

File Layout

Response

Error Handling

GET /api/v1/cron/cleanup

Authentication

Cleanup Operations

Response

Error Codes

GET /api/v1/cron/staging-janitor

Authentication

Configuration

Response

Error Codes

GET /api/v1/cron/approvals-expire

Authentication

Configuration

Recommended schedule

Response

Error codes

GET /api/v1/cron/ai-autopilot

Authentication

Response

GET /api/v1/cron/ai-sentinel

Authentication

Response

Complete cron job catalog

POST /api/cron/tick

Authentication

Example

Response

Error Isolation

Environment Variables